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A functional representation of potential surprise ordering
Se Ho Kwak ★
University of Massachusetts Amherst

ABSTRACT
In the history of economic thought, Shackle was one of the representative critics about probability based economic theory. Specifically,
he constructed his own concept of subjective uncertainty called potential surprise to replace probability. In 1980s, the potential surprise
is axiomatized by Katzner as Kolmogorov-styled measure defined on the 𝜎-field over the set of possible states. In this paper, potential
surprise function is reconstructed as the functional representation of potential surprise ordering on the space of hypotheses about future
called monad.
Key words: Shackle, uncertainty, probability
JEL classifications: B21; B50; D81
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1. Introduction

In the history of economic thought, G.L.S. Shackle is a major critic of probability and expected utility
theory (hereafter EUT). Shackle’s objections to that theory mainly concerns the major properties
which probability stands on, such as dependence on the repetitive experiment, distribution of
probability values that sum to the unity, and additivity of probability for mutually independent events.
Specifically, if the probability is construed in terms of frequency, then the probability calculus cannot
be utilized when the choice is a single, unique activity because the probability value has meaning only
when an experiment is to be repeated infinite numbers of times. But almost all economic decisions in
reality are unique and irreversible. Besides, representing the possibility of an event having no
supporting evidence with zero probability is not a suitable way to reflect ignorance on the part of the
decision maker. The assignment of zero probability is relevant to the “knowledge” that the relative
frequency of a specific event in a repetitive experiment is zero, and this is different from disbeliefs
due to the lack of supporting information.
Not only that, if the probability is thought of as subjective, then for probability to be a
meaningful concept, it is necessary that the decision maker has stable knowledge for all possible past
and future outcomes. If not, for example, any potential change in the number of alternative outcomes
in the future must alter the probability assigned to previously known outcomes. Furthermore, with
maintaining the notion of additive probability, it is not possible to represent 𝑛 > 2 independent events
whose realization and nonrealization are assessed as equally plausible with the identical probability
value. 1 If additivity is preserved in such case, then the summation of probability 𝑛/2 could be bigger
than unity, in other words, the distributivity of probability is violated.
Hence, instead of the problematic use of probability as a basis for expected utility theory,
Shackle constructed his own alternative theoretical framework explaining human decisions on the
premise of historical time, ignorance of future events, and a non-probabilistic measure of uncertainty
(Shackle 1954, 1969, 1972). 2

1

P.29 in Shackle (1954).
These arguments by Shackle are summarized in J.L. Ford (1999). Further detailed comparisons from technical and
practical perspectives is stated in a later section.
2
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However, although Shackle’s criticism of probability was accepted by several Austrians and
Post Keynesians, and even influenced several efforts to construct alternative approaches to decision
making, e.g., Ellsberg (1962) and Shafer (1976), his own approach has not gained much traction
among decision theorists and microeconomists. As Zappia (2005) pointed out, Shackle ignored the
trend in modern decision theory inspired by Savage’s subjective expected utility theory (hereafter,
SEUT) because in Shackle’s view, there was no fundamental difference in Savage’s probabilistic
construction of SEUT from decision theory based on the frequentist approach to probability. 3
However the trend ignored by Shackle pushed decision theory into variations of the EUT model with
increased technical sophistication in order to solve ‘anomalies’ that violated an axiom or prediction
of EUT such as the Allais paradox (Allais 1953, Machina 1983), the common ratio effect (Allais 1953,
Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the Ellsberg paradox (1961). 4 In this process, Shackle’s decision
theory seems to have been forgotten.
There were several attempts to formalize Shackle’s approach with technical language such as
Levi (1979, 1980), Ford (1983), Ponsonnet (1996). Other authors argued that certain technical aspects
of Shacklean theory can be related to various currents of non-standard decision theory such as
evidence theory (Shafer, 1976) in Fioretti (2001), and possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978) in Prade and
Yager (1994) and Klir (2002). However, these investigations are mainly partial formalizations of
Shackle’s individual decision steps, or alluding similarity to other currents of decision theory. As far
as translating Shackle’s ideas into the communicable technical language of modern decision theory
is concerned, it is not apparent that these results were generally accepted as a comprehensive and
coherent formalization of Shacklean decision theory. As Gorgescu-Roegen (1958) argued, the lack
of a clear and sound axiomatic structure has undermined the potentiality of Shackle’s insights and
prevented Shackle’s model from obtaining the attention it deserves.
However, contrary to the tendency described above, there was a movement at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst during the last quarter of the 20th century to rehabilitate Shacklean ideas.
This movement which included, at a fundamental level, a new rigorous formalization of Shackle’s
decision theory which, most importantly, was expressed in terms of the common language of modern
3

P. 36 in Shackle (1954)
Roughly speaking, since the 1980s, EUT has been generalized in two distinctive but closely related ways: Rank
Dependent Expected Utility Theory by Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987) etc.; and Choquet Expected Utility Theory based on
the concept of “capacity function” formalized by Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989).
4
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decision theory. In particular, economists such as R. Bausor, J. Crotty, D. Vickers and D. W. Katzner
(hereafter, Amherst Methodologists Group: AMG) focused on Shackle’s insights in seeking an
alternative theoretic framework in sharp contrast to that of mainstream economics. Vickers (1978,
1987, 1994) employed Shacklean ideas in understanding firm behavior and financial decisions.
Bausor (1982-83, 1984) focused on the issue of kaleidics and historical time experienced by actual
economic agents. Crotty (1994) saw Shacklean theory as a framework for explaining the behavior of
economic agents confronting a period of uncertainty in which the conventions that drove behavior in
the pre-existing order had broken down. Interacting with these developments, Katzner provided a
totally reformalized version of Shacklean decision theory (Katzner 1986-7, 1987-88, 1989-90) and
extended the range of its application to simultaneous behavior (Katzner 1995), the demand for money
(Katzner 2001), firm behavior (Katzner 1990-91), and macroeconomic phenomena (Katzner 1998).
This series of studies was combined and expanded in a single book (Katzner 1998). Since Katzner
nearly completed the task of reformalizing Shackle’s approach, the reformalized theory deserves to
be called Shackle-Katzner decision theory (hereafter, SKDT)5. That work furnishes Shacklean theory
new room for interaction with modern decision theory and mainstream economics. The present work
focuses on the issues raised by the AMG and specifically by Katzner’s contribution. The purpose of
it is to provide a reformalized frameworks for SKDT in terms of the language of order and utility
theory.
For this task, in section 2, first we will briefly summarize the whole process of decision-making
described in SKDT. In section 3, we will investigate topological and order structure from which
functional representations of potential surprise orderings can be derived. Shackle’s potential surprise
function as introduced by Katzner (1986-87, 1987-88, 1998) emerges from it. As the basis from
which these functional representations are obtained, a new space of unbreakable hypotheses named
monad and the space of the scale for potential surprise called degree space will be introduced.

5

It is worth noting that there has been another major contribution to discussions of uncertainty that is irreducible to
probabilistic risk. This tradition is called Knightian decision theory. Although it may include many different currents of
non-Savagean expected utility (Nishimura and Ozaki 2017), the representative idea was formalized by Bewley (2001).
Recent work on the implication of Knightian uncertainty in a general equilibrium framework (Rigotti and Shannon 2005,
Bewlely 2011, Ma 2015) has been based on Bewley’s formalization. In the Shacklean context, Katzner achieved similar
results to Bewley.
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2. Choice under uncertainty in SKDT
In SKDT, decisions are made in a two-stage process. Encountering a problem of choice facing an
uncertain future, the decision maker in stage 1 recognizes a set X of all available actions, a set Ω of
all imaginable future states of the world. A nonempty collection 𝑭∗ of subsets of Ω is called 𝜎-field
over Ω if for any A in 𝑭∗ and countable collection {A𝑖 | A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭∗ }, it satisfies A𝑐 in F*, ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 in F*,
and ⋂𝑖 A𝑖 in 𝑭∗ . In Shackle’s terminology, each element of 𝑭∗ is called an hypothesis. Based on the
recognition of available actions in X and hypotheses in 𝑭∗ , the decision maker imagines (1) the degree
of surprise he/she would feel now upon the future realization of an element of an hypotheses in 𝑭∗
and (2) the future payoff summoned by the realization of a state of the world together with his/her
chosen action from X. Here (1) is formalized as a potential surprise function defined on 𝑭∗ into [0, 1]
and (2) is represented in term of a payoff function (e.g. a utility or a profit function) defined on X ×
Ω to the real space R. This notion of potential surprise is the original concept conceived by Shackle
(1954, 1969), and redefined in functional form by Katzner (1986-87, 1998).6 The latter is a nondistributive, non-additive function, and its functional values indicate the degree of surprise called
forth by the realization of a specific hypothesis in 𝑭∗ .
At stage two, for each decision option 𝑥 in X the decision maker is thought to focus on two pairs
each consisting of a potential surprise and a payoff value that grabs his/her attention. One pair of a
potential surprise and a payoff value is associated with possible “gains”, the other pair with possible
“losses.” The determination of these pairs of values emerges from maximizing an attractiveness
(ascendancy) function defined on [0, 1] × R subject to a density function obtained from the potential
surprise function. The pairs of values for each action are then evaluated in terms of a decision index
or gambler preference map that expresses the decision maker’s valuation on potential surprise and
payoff. Here, it is worth noting that the attractiveness function excludes the less important baskets of
payoff and potential surprise values generated by each action, and restricts the decision maker’s focus
to only the most attractive pairs of payoff and potential surprise values for each action. The decision
index operates only on those selected pairs.

6

In Shackle (1969, p.79-85), a series of axiom was provided. For the rigorous functional form, see p. 46-59 of Katzner
(1986-87, 1998).
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[Figure 2.1]
Schematically, process of decision making in SKDT can be illustrated in Figure 2.1. In the lefthand diagram, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are two decision options in 𝑿. The diagram pointed to by curved arrow 1
indicates the determination of the two maximizing pairs of potential surprise and payoff values from
decision options 𝑎 and 𝑏. The domain of potential surprise function s is Ω 7 and the domain of the
payoff function u is the product space of the set of available acts X and the space of states of the world
Ω. This implies that the decision maker expresses the degree of uncertainty about states of the world
in concrete numerical terms, and the options of choice in X do not influence the decision maker’s
valuation of potential surprise for each state of the world. The two wing-shaped curves in center
diagram of the figure 2.1. indicates the potential surprise density functions Fa and Fb transposed to be
defined over the conceivable possible payoffs resulting from actions a and b respectively. Isoattractiveness curves for each act are elicited by attractiveness function, whose domain is the plane
of payoff and potential surprise values, i.e., R × [0, 1]. Here the locus of the potential surprise density
function behaves as a constraint. Under such constraint, the attractiveness maximizing points for each
act can be found at a tangency between a potential surprise locus and an iso-attractiveness contour.
Among those points selected by the attractiveness maximizing process for each act, the decision
maker makes comparisons (the right-hand diagram after arrow 2) according to their values in the
decision index. Then, the pair with the maximal value in decision index determines which act is to be
finally chosen.

7

For composite hypotheses made of unions, negation and intersection of hypotheses, the domain is extended to the
entire 𝑭∗ .
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3. Functional Representation of potential surprise ordering

In this section, we will formulate the potential surprise function in relation to underlying orderings.
This will provide an alternative and illuminating way to think of potential surprise. Recall that Ω is
an incomplete set of states of the world and 𝑭∗ is a 𝜎-field on Ω containing uncountable unions and
intersections of subsets of Ω. In what follows, I will set out some of the basic ideas that are relevant
and some of the fundamental propositions that can be proved in relation to the potential surprise
function. Begin with the following additional definitions.
Definition 3.1 For any A in 𝑭∗ , an hypothesis B in 𝑭∗ is called rival to A if A ∩ B = ∅.
Definition 3.2 An exhaustive collection of rival hypotheses is defined as a collection of hypotheses
{A𝑖 } such that:
(i) A1 = 𝜙.
(ii) A𝑖 is nonempty hypothesis for each i ≠ 1.
(iii) For all i ≠ 𝑗, A𝑖 and A𝑗 are rival hypotheses.
(iv) ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 = Ω.
Definition 3.3 Katzner (1998) A potential surprise function on 𝑭∗ is a function s: 𝑭∗ → [0, 1] such
that:
i) For all A in 𝑭∗ , 0 ≤ 𝑠(A) ≤ 1.
ii) For any (possibly uncountable) collection {A𝑖 } of nonempty subsets in 𝑭∗ ,
s(⋃𝑖 A𝑖 ) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖 𝑠(Ai ).
iii) If {A𝑖 } is an exhaustive set of rival hypothesis, then s(A𝑖 ) = 0 for at least one i.
Definition 3.4 Let s be a potential surprise function on 𝑭∗ . If an hypothesis A in 𝑭∗ has zero potential
surprise value, i.e. s(A) = 0, then the hypothesis A is said to be perfectly possible. If s(A) = 1, then
the hypothesis A is said to be perfectly impossible.
In addition, based on a concept opposite to that of potential surprise, the potential confirmation
function is defined in SKDT as follows:

8

Definition 3.3.A. A potential confirmation function on 𝑭∗ is a function c: 𝑭∗ → [0, 1] such that:
i) For all A in 𝑭∗ , 0 ≤ c(A) ≤ 1.
ii) For any collection {Ai} of nonempty subsets in 𝑭∗ ,
c(⋃𝑖 A𝑖 ) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝑖 𝑐(A𝑖 ).
iii) If {Ai} is an exhaustive set of rival hypothesis, then c(A𝑖 ) = 1 for at least one i.
The potential confirmation function was introduced by Katzner (1986-7, 1998). It is the analogue of
probability in the SKDT context. The potential confirmation of an hypothesis A in 𝑭∗ is the degree of
confidence the decision maker feels now were the future realization of an element of A to occur. Like
potential surprise, potential confirmation is not founded on any knowledge of the future. It is therefore
conceptually distinguished from probability. The potential confirmation function also has a different
axiomatic base than the probability function. Because SKDT as originally presented is based on
potential surprise, the remainder of this section is focused on it. We will return to potential
confirmation at the end of the section. It should be noted here that in general, for all A in 𝑭∗ , c(A) =
1 - s(A) does not necessarily hold.8
Our task here is reconstructing Katzner’s potential surprise function above by finding exact
mathematical conditions guaranteeing a representation of that function based on an underlying
“original” ordering on 𝑭∗ . The reason for expressing potential surprise in terms of an underlying
ordering is to provide additional insight into that concept in a more intuitive level. Although the usual
concept of probability is reducible in terms of Lebesgue measure defined on the sample space, the
construction of subjective probability has been established from the ordering relation defined in the
decision space. Since the early development of EUT like Von Neumann and Morgenstein (1944), De
Finetti (1936), and Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Savage (1954), the ordinal relation of probability
is common starting point to derive the subjective probability and the expected utility. In addition,
there is a large literature on comparative probability studying the ordering relation underlying
probability which has added to an understanding of that concept (Fine 1973, Fishburn 1983a, 1983b)
or qualitative probability theory (Krantz et al., 1971; Luce, 1967; Luce and Narens, 1978; Narens,

8

For detailed explanation, see Katzner (1998) p.62.
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1980). Hence deriving the potential surprise function from an underlying order relation can constitute
to an understanding of SKDT by giving more meaning to potential surprise.
However, before doing to this, we need to identify an appropriate subdomain F of 𝑭∗ on which
the initial order is defined. The extension of that order and its functional representation onto the full
𝜎-field 𝑭∗ will be conducted later.
Let 𝛼 ∈ 𝜴 be a state of the world. Then we denote an arbitrary nonempty subset of Ω
contained in 𝑭∗ containing α as Aα, and the intersection of all such sets as A(𝛼 ) = ⋂ A𝛼 .
Definition 3.5

A monad F on Ω is a family of subsets of 𝑭∗ having the form of F = {A(𝛼) ≠

∅ | for each 𝛼 ∈ 𝛀 } ∪ {∅} where the intersection is taken over all sets Aα for each 𝛼 ∈ 𝛀.9
Remark 3.6 For given 𝜎 -field 𝑭∗ , F is the collection of the smallest sets in 𝑭∗ containing each α in
Ω. Here the smallest subset of Ω for each 𝛼 is uniquely determined. Suppose that we pick an arbitrary
A(α) from F with 𝛼 ≠ 𝛽 ∈A(α), then we can show A(𝛼) = A(𝛽). Suppose not. Firstly, when A(𝛼) ⊂
A(𝛽). Then A(𝛽).is not the smallest set including 𝛽 because 𝛽 in 𝐴(𝛼). Secondly, when A(𝛼) ≠
A(𝛽) but any inclusion does not hold between A(𝛼) and A(𝛽), we can see that 𝛽 ∈ A(𝛼 )⋂A(𝛽) ⊂
A(𝛽). This is contradiction because A(β) is not the smallest subset including β. Therefore A(𝛼) =
A(𝛽). This means that each 𝛼 in 𝛀 corresponds to the unique element of F.
Remark 3.7

For a given 𝑭∗ , F is uniquely determined. Conversely, 𝑭∗ is also constructible from F.

Each hypothesis in 𝑭∗ is made of some union or complement or intersection of elements of F.
Remark 3.8

The monad is the collection of all unit, that is to say, indecomposable hypotheses

generating all composite hypotheses made by taking unions, intersections and complements among
monad elements. Since no states of the world can be contained in 𝝓, this is interpretable as some
unknown possibility beyond all current imaginable hypotheses listed in the monad. This is the reason
why 𝝓 is called as “residual hypothesis” in SKDT10.

9

It may seem that an exhaustive collection of rival hypothesis has a similar form to a monad F. But sets in an
exhaustive collection of rival hypothesis is decomposable again into monad elements.
10
See p.47 in Katzner (1998) and p. 49-50 in Shackle (1969).
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Remark 3.9

By the condition ii) of definition 3.3, it is easily verified that s(𝛀) = infA∈𝑭 s(A). But

this does not imply that there exists an hypothesis A in F such that s(𝛀) = s(A). For example, we can
√2

think {𝑠 (A𝑖 )|for all A𝑖 in 𝑭} converging to s(𝛀) = 100,000 but s(Ai) ⊂ 𝑸 ∩ [0,1]. This means that
𝑠(𝑭) ⊆ 𝑠(𝑭∗ ). We will annihilate this kind of cases by introducing an appropriate assumption on
mathematical property of the monad F.

Representation of potential surprise ordering
Our task is to justify the existing conditions defining the potential surprise function in definition 3.3
by constructing an axiomatic system of the ‘potential surprise order’ defined on the set of hypotheses
F* rather than establishing a novel model describing the surprised response of a decision maker with
respect to the realization of unexpected events. For this, we will refer to the existing outcomes of the
theory of order and utility for the current context.
Suppose there is a binary relation ≽s on a monad F over 𝛀 and consider the following
conditions:
3.10 (Reflexive) For any A in F, A ≽s A.
3.11 (Transitive) For any A, B and C in F, A ≽s B and B ≽s C ⇒ A ≽s C.
3.12 (Total) For any A, B in F, either A ≽s B or B ≽s A.
Definition 3.13 If a binary relation on F satisfies condition 3.10 and 3.11, then it is called a preorder
of potential surprise on F. If a binary relation on F satisfies 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12, then it is called a
total preorder of potential surprise on F.
Definition 3.14 For a subset D of the monad F and a total preorder ≽s of potential surprise on F, if
A ≽s B and B ≽s A hold for any A, B in, D, then A and B are said to be equivalent and denoted by A
~s B. In addition, the subset D of F is said to be an equivalence class in F over ~s, and the quotient
̅
set F/~s, i.e. the set of all equivalence classes is F is called the degree space of ≽s , and denoted by 𝑭
= F/~s.
Definition 3.15 If for any A, B in F, A ≽s B but not A~s B, then it is called strict total preorder of
potential surprise on F and denoted by ≻s.
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Remark 3.16 Note that the equivalence class D of A and B over ~s is also denotable by [A] or [B].
̅ , we can define the same total preorder ≽s of F onto 𝑭
̅ as
Furthermore, for any distinct [A], [C] in 𝑭
A ≽s C ⇒[A] ≽s [C]. From now, the bracket [ ] will be omitted when the domain of order is specified
̅.
as 𝑭
̅ from F in remark 3.16 is
By the definition of equivalence class, the total preorder extended onto 𝑭
̅ satisfying A ≽s B and B ≽s A, A = B holds
antisymmetric. In other words, for any A, B in 𝑭
̅ is total order, i.e., reflexive, transitive, total and antisymmetric.
automatically. Then ≽s on 𝑭
Definition 3.17 A total preorder ≽s of potential surprise on F is also called a total order of potential
̅.
surprise on 𝑭
Note that while elements of F, 𝑭∗ are concrete hypotheses which can be ordered by the degree of
̅ can be understood as the degree itself of potential surprise. In
potential surprise, the elements of 𝑭
actual reasoning process to make a decision, the degree of emotional response such as doubtfulness
or confirmation on the realization of a possible future event is actually sensible by a decision maker
in assigning some rank to each different hypothesis on possible future event. Of course, such degree
̅ reflects this context.
is not measurable as a real number scale. We can see that the character of the set 𝑭
Now consider an additional condition that permits the range of elements that can be compared
under the relation ≽s to be extended to 𝑭∗ . Before doing this, let’s introduce the following definitions.
̅ , such that for all [A],[B] in 𝑭
̅ − K and there
Definition 3.18 If there exists a countable subset K of 𝑭
̅ is called order separable and K is called order
exists [C] in K such that [A] ≻s [C] ≻s [B], then 𝑭
̅.
dense in 𝑭
̅.
Definition 3.19 Let F be a monad defined on Ω and ≽s be a total order of potential surprise on 𝑭
̅ , a lower bound for K is an element [A] in 𝑭
̅ , for which [K] ≽s [A] for all [K] in
For a subset K of 𝑭
K. If the set of all lower bound of K has the greatest element, then it is called the greatest lower bound
of K or infimum of K and denoted by inf K.
3.20 (Reducibility) For any hypothesis C ∈ F* with C =∪ A𝑖 where A𝑖 in F for all i in some
̅ | i in I } holds.
indexing set I, [C] ∼s inf { [Ai] in 𝑭

12

As a simple illustration of reducibility for the finite case, for any event 𝐶 ∈ 𝑭∗ with 𝐶 = 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 where
A, B ∈ F and B ≽s A, A ∼s C holds. The intuition of reducibility is that as the coverage of future
states in 𝛀 included in a union hypothesis is broader, the doubtfulness regarding the realization of
that union hypothesis is as much low as the least doubtful hypothesis within it.
Remark 3.21 It is trivial that the bigger a set in 𝑭∗ is, the lower the rank of the set in 𝑭∗ is. That is
to say, for A, B in 𝑭∗ , A ⊂ B ⇒ A ≽s B.
By virtue of the reducibility, we can extend the range of ordering on F onto the entire 𝜎-field F*
whose elements can be constructed by unions of elements from Monad F. Being different to the
̅ are originated
commodity space 𝐑𝑛+ or the space of utility value R in consumer theory, F, F* and 𝑭
from the hypotheses of a decision maker on future events. Thus there is no guarantee that they have
identical mathematical structures to the real space. Specifically, without imposing some mathematical
̅ guaranteeing the existence of infimum, the axiom of reducibility over ≽s may fail.
restriction to 𝑭
Then we are unable to exclude pathological cases like remark 3.9 because it is possible that the real
value s(C) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖 𝑠(A𝑖 ) where C = ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 , C ∈ 𝑭∗ and A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭 as definition 3.3-ii) does not have its
preimage in F, i.e. 𝑠 −1 (C) ∉ {A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭| 𝑠(C) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖 𝑠(A𝑖 ), C = ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 } . Thus, we cannot assign
proper order of degree of potential surprise to the hypothesis C. To exclude mathematical complexity,
̅ , i.e., every non-empty subset of 𝑭
̅ with a
we need to assume the greatest lower bound property of 𝑭
̅.
lower bound has a greatest lower bound or infimum in 𝑭
3.22 (Completeness)

̅ has the greatest lower bound property.
𝑭

̅ will be maintained through the end of current paper. The next definition
Assuming completeness of 𝑭
is necessary in proving proposition 3.24 for the functional representation of total order of potential
̅.
surprise on 𝑭
Definition 3.23 Let ≽ be a preorder on a set 𝐗, and 𝑥, 𝑦 elements of 𝐗. The open interval (𝑥, 𝑦) =
{𝑧 ∈ 𝐗| 𝑦 ≻ 𝑧 ≻ 𝑥} is called a jump if it is empty. Here, 𝑥 and 𝑦 are called end points of the jump
(𝑥, 𝑦). Also, 𝑥 is called an immediate successor of 𝑦, and 𝑦 is an immediate predecessor of 𝑥.
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̅ means degrees of potential surprise so denotable by small letters a, b, c, elements
While elements of 𝑭
of F, 𝑭∗ are subsets of 𝛀 and usually denoted by A, B, C. In upcoming discussion, for simplicity, we
will use small letters for elements of F, F* when it is convenient.

̅
Proposition 3.24 Functional representation of the total order of potential surprise on 𝑭
̅ , i.e., a total preorder of potential surprise on F.
Let ≽s be a total order of potential surprise on 𝑭
̅ is order separable, then there exists a real valued function s mapping F into R representing
1) If 𝑭

≽s , i.e. A ≽s B in F ⟺ s(A) ≥ s(B).
̅ is order separable and the reducibility holds, then there exists a real valued function s
2) If 𝑭
mapping 𝑭∗ into R representing ≽s , i.e. A ≽s B in 𝑭∗ ⟺ s(A) ≥ s(B).
Proof.
̅ has a countable order dense subset 𝑲𝟏 , and let 𝑲𝟐 be the set of end points of all
1) Suppose that 𝑭
̅ . As a claim, we will see 𝑲𝟐 is countable. Let (𝑥, 𝑦) be a jump in 𝑭
̅ . Then by the definition
jumps of 𝑭
of order separability, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑲𝟏 or 𝑦 ∈ 𝑲𝟏 . If 𝑥 ∉ 𝑲𝟏 , then 𝑦 is an immediate successor of 𝑥, and 𝑦 ∈
𝑲𝟏 . If 𝑦 ∉ 𝑲𝟏 , then 𝑥 is an immediate predecessor of 𝑦, and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑲𝟏 . Since ≽s is total, there is 1-1
function from the set 𝑲𝟐 of end points of all jumps into the countable set 𝑲𝟏 . Then 𝑲𝟐 is also
countable.
̅ ×𝑭
̅ → {0, 1} as follows.
Let 𝑲 = 𝑲𝟏 ∪ 𝑲𝟐 = {𝑘1 , 𝑘2 , 𝑘3 , … } and define a function 𝛿: 𝑭
𝛿 (𝑥, 𝑦) = {

𝛿(𝑎,𝑘𝑛 )
1 if 𝑥 ≻𝑠 𝑦
̅ → 𝑹 as 𝑟(𝑎) = ∑∞
and define a function 𝑟: 𝑭
𝑛=1 2𝑛 .
0 otherwise

For an arbitrary pair a, b with b ≽s a if for some n, a ≻s 𝑘𝑛 , then b ≻s 𝑘𝑛 . Thus 𝑟(𝑏) ≥ 𝑟(𝑎).
̅. Then there is some 𝑛 with 𝑎 = 𝑘𝑛, hence
Now let b ≻𝑠 a. If (𝑎, 𝑏) is a jump, then 𝑎 ∈ 𝑭𝟐 ⊂ 𝑭
𝑎 ≻ s 𝑘𝑛 does not hold. Thus 𝑟(𝑏) > 𝑟(𝑎). When (𝑎, 𝑏) is not a jump, then there exists c with
𝑏 ≻𝑠 𝑐 ≻𝑠 𝑎. If 𝑎 ∈ 𝑲, then 𝑟(𝑏) > 𝑟(𝑎). can be shown by the similar way just before. Suppose 𝑎 ∉
𝑲. If 𝑐 ∈ 𝑲, then 𝑐 = 𝑘𝑛 for some 𝑛 where 𝑏 ≻s 𝑘𝑛 but not 𝑐 ≻s 𝑘𝑛 . Thus 𝑟(𝑏) > 𝑟(𝑎). If 𝑐 ∉ 𝑲,
then there exists 𝑘𝑛 ∈ 𝑲 such that c ≻𝑠 𝑘𝑛 ≻𝑠 a because 𝑎 ∉ 𝑲 and the order separability. Thus 𝑏 ≻s
𝑘𝑛 but 𝑎 ≻s 𝑘𝑛 does not hold. Thus 𝑟(𝑏) > 𝑟(𝑎).
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̅ is equivalent to the total preorder ≽s on F, the proposition is
Since the total order ≽s on 𝑭
proven.
2) Pick an arbitrary A ∈ 𝑭∗ . When A ∈ 𝑭, the existence of its functional representation preserving the
total preorder on 𝑭 was already shown in 1) of this proposition. If 𝐴 ∈ 𝑭∗ − 𝑭, then by the definition
of Monad, there is a collection of hypotheses { A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭 | A = ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 for some indexing set I }. Then by
̅ |A = ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 }. Also, by completeness of 𝑭
̅ , there exists A𝑜 ∈ 𝑭
̅ such that
reducibility, A ∼s inf {A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭
̅ is a lower bound of {A𝑖 ∈ 𝑭
̅ |A = ⋃𝑖 A𝑖 }. Then s(A𝑖 )
A𝑖 ≽s A𝑜 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and A𝑜 ≽s B where B ∈ 𝑭
≥ s(A𝑜 ) and s(A𝑜 ) ≥ s(B) where s(A𝑖 ) ≥ s(B) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼. Hence 𝑠(A) = 𝑠(A𝑜 ) = inf {𝑠(A𝑖 )}. In this
manner, the order preserving functional representation of total preorder on 𝑭 can be extended to the
entire 𝑭∗ . ■
Proposition 3-24 deals with only the existence of functional representations. In order to conduct
conventional maximizing processes in the present context, it is necessary to have a continuous
potential surprise function on. In consumer choice theory, in order to determine if a continuous utility
representation of a consumer’s preference ordering exists, it is enough to check the relative openness
of upper and lower contour sets at points in the interior of the commodity space 𝐑𝑛+ . However, since
currently we are considering the space of hypotheses which may not be homeomorphic to Euclidean
space, we need to consider topological conditions in general to ensure the existence of a continuous
functional representation of potential surprise orderings.
Definition 3.25

1. Let R be an arbitrary binary relation on F and R’ be a binary relation on F’. A

function f is called an order isomorphism on F into F’ if for any A, B in F, AR B if and only if
f(A)R’ f(B).
Definition 3.26 Let (F, ≽s) be a totally preordered set, i.e., reflexive, transitive and total. If for each
A ∈ F the upper section [A, ∞) = { B | B ≽s A}and the lower section (−∞, A] = { B | A ≽s B}are
closed, then ≽ is said to be continuous order.
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Notation 3.27 Let F be a set and T be a topology on F.11 Then we will denote this topological space
as (F, T ). If topology on F is not specified, we can simply denote F as a topological space in general.
Definition 3.28 For a given topology T on a set F, a basis B for this topology T is a collection of
subsets of F (called basis element) such that i) for each x in F, there is at least one basis element
𝐵 containing x, and ii) If x belongs to the intersection of two basis element 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 , then there is a
basis element B3 containing x such that 𝐵3 ⊂ 𝐵1 ∩ 𝐵2 . 12 A subbasis S for the topology T is a
collection of subsets of F such that B = {𝐵 | 𝐵 is the intersection of finitely many members of S } is
basis for T .
Definition 3.29 A topological space F is called separable if F has a countable dense subset; second
countable if F has a countable basis for T ; connected if F does not have any pairs of disjoint
nonempty open subsets of F such that its union is F.
Definition 3.30 Let ≽ be a total preorder on a set F. If the set of all strict upper section (A, ∞) ={ B
| B ≻s A }and strict lower sections (∞, 𝑥) = { B | A ≻s B }is a subbasis for a topology on F, then this
topology is called the order topology, and denoted by T≽ .
Definition 3.31 For arbitrary two topologies T1,T2 on F, if T1 ⊇T2 , then T1 is called finer than T2
or T2 is called coarser than T1.
̅
Now we are ready to see the continuous representation of total order of potential surprise on 𝑭
and the extended one to 𝑭∗ . The following two theorems are based on the standard outcomes of utility
theory in Debreu (1964) and adjusted here for the context of the space of degree and hypotheses.
̅ be a connected, separable topological space and ≽s a
Theorem 3.32 Let a degree space 𝑭
̅ . If the condition 3.22 holds, then there exists a
continuous total order of potential surprise on 𝑭

A topology on a set F is a collection T of subsets of F having the following properties: 1) ∅ and F are in T . 2) The
union of elements of any subcollection of T is in T. 3) The intersection of the elements of any finite subcollection of is
T in T.
12
We can define the topology T generated by B as follows: A subset U of F is said to be open in F if for each x ∈ F,
there is a basis element B ∈B basis such that x ∈ B and B ⊂ U. Note that each basis element is itself an element of T.
11
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continuous real-valued order isomorphism s on 𝑭∗ to R such that A ≽s B ⇔ s(A) ≥ s(B) and the
condition ii) of definition 3.3 holds.
Proof.
̅ and F can be secured by Debreu (1964). Its extension
The existence of functional representation on 𝑭
to F* satisfying ii) of definition 3.3 can be shown as the proof for the 2) of proposition 3.24. ■
̅ in theorem 3.31 can be replaced by the second
The connectedness and the separability of 𝑭
countability as the next theorem.

̅ be a second countable topological space and ≽s a continuous total order of
Theorem 3.33 Let 𝑭
̅ . If the condition 3.21 holds, then there exists a continuous real-valued order
potential surprise on 𝑭
isomorphism s on 𝑭∗ to R such that A ≽s B ⇔ s(A) ≥ s(B) and the condition ii) of definition 3.3 holds.
Proof.
̅ . For each 𝑎 ∈ 𝑭
̅ , let 𝐿(𝑎) =
Let 𝑲 = {𝐾1 𝐾2 , 𝐾3 , … } be a countable basis for the topology of 𝑭
1
̅ → 𝑹 as 𝑟(𝑎) = ∑∞
{𝑛|𝑎 ≻𝑠 𝑥, for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝐾𝑛 } and define a function 𝑟: 𝑭
𝑛∈𝐿(𝑎) 2𝑛 . If 𝑏 ≽s 𝑎, then

𝐿(𝑎) ⊆ 𝐿(𝑏). Thus 𝑟(𝑏) ≽s 𝑟(𝑎). If 𝑏 ≻𝑠 𝑎, then 𝑎 ∈ (−∞, 𝑏). So there exists 𝑛 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐾𝑛 ⊂
(−∞, b). Thus 𝑛 ∈ 𝐿(𝑏) − 𝐿(𝑎) and 𝑟(𝑏) ≻𝑠 𝑟(𝑎). The extension of order isomorphism to F*
satisfying the condition ii) of definition 3.3 can be done by similar way so far.

■

Although the previous two theorems reflect standard results of topological generalization regarding
order isomorphism, it seems unclear to expect topological properties of the hypothesis space 𝑭∗ and
̅ . The following theorem presents looser condition than the previous two theorems.
the degree space 𝑭
̅ is order separable with respect to a total order ≽s of potential surprise
Theorem 3.34 Suppose that 𝑭
̅ . If an arbitrary topology T of 𝑭
̅ is finer than its order topology T≽ and the condition 3.22 holds,
on 𝑭
then there exists a continuous real-valued order isomorphism s on F* to [0, 1] such that the condition
ii) of definition 3.3 holds.
̅ is just order
The proof of theorem 3.34 can be easily verified as following. When a topology of 𝑭
topology or finer than it, once if any two different degrees of potential surprise are comparable by
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another degree between them, then such degrees can be represented by real numbers. So, the only
information we need to discern is whether a topology on the degree space is finer than order topology.
In fact, it is well-known that the order topology on a continuous total preordered space is the coarsest
one. Thus theorem 3.34 is generalized statement enough to deal with arbitrary sorts of topologies
given to the degree space.
So far, we have obtained the functional representation of a potential surprise ordering on F*
which satisfies only conditions ii) of definition 3.3. Now, to derive i) and iii) of definition 3.3, we
need a condition that guarantees the existence of subset of Ω having zero potential surprise value.
Definition 3.35 Let F be a topological space and ≽ be a preorder on F. A subset K of F is called
decreasing if for all 𝑥, 𝑦 in F, x in K and 𝑥 ≽ 𝑦 implies that 𝑦 in K, increasing if 𝑥 in K and 𝑦 ≽ 𝑥
implies that 𝑦 in K.
Definition 3.36 A topological space (F, T) is normal if for each pair K1, K2 of disjoint closed subsets
of F, there exist two disjoint open subsets M1 and M2 such that K1 ⊂ M1 and K2 ⊂ M2.

By the theorem 3.38 below, the normality of monad F can guarantee the existence of a perfectly
possible hypothesis in iii) of the definition 3.3. From this, we introduce another axiom for F.
3.37 (Normality)

A monad F is normal.

Theorem 3.38 Nachbin Separation Theorem
Suppose that a monad F is a normal space and has a total preorder. If Ko and K1 are disjoint closed
subsets of F such that Ko is decreasing and K1 is increasing, then Ko and K1 can be separated by a
continuous monotone 13 function s: F → [0, 1] such that s(Ko) = {0} and s(K1) = {1}. 14

13

A function f from a preordered F to [0, 1] is called monotone increasing if for all pair a, b in F with a ≽ b, f(a) ≥ f(b)
holds, and monotone decreasing if f(a) ≥ f(b). If a function f is monotone increasing or decreasing, then f is called
monotone.
14
For proof, see p.26 of Nachbin (1950).
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Now by virtue of the normality, we can inject degrees of potential surprise right into [0, 1] and get
some hint on the shape of potential surprise locus in the figure 2.1. Intuitively, Ko is the subregion of
the monad F, which is interpretable as the set of “perfectly possible” hypotheses, i.e., those satisfying
𝑠(A) = 0, A ∈ 𝑭. And K1 is the set of “perfectly impossible” hypothesis satisfying 𝑠(B) = 1, B ∈
𝑭. From theorem 3.38, between two extreme potential surprise values 0 and 1, the potential surprise
value of each hypothesis is assigned, as Nachbin’s theorem says, through a monotone pattern.
However, to get exact shape of potential surprise locus, we need to consider the relation between the
potential surprise function and the payoff function. If the relation between potential surprise and
payoff information is specified appropriately, then the shape of potential surprise locus can be drawn
as in Figure 2.1.

Potential surprise values of Ω and 𝝓
It remains to determine the function values assigned to s(Ω) and s(𝝓). Since Ω is the biggest set
containing every element A of the monad F, it follows that A ≽s Ω and s(𝛀) = infA∈𝑭 𝑠(A) holds.
Since the condition iii) of definition 3.3 was confirmed by the normality F of theorem 3.38, 𝑠(𝛀) =
0. In other words, the decision maker trusts the current range 𝛀 of imaginable future states as perfectly
possible.
On the other hand, the order of 𝝓 is assigned initially by the total preorder ≽s of potential
surprise on the monad F. As an example, suppose A ≻s 𝝓 for an arbitrary A in 𝑭∗ . Then, by theorems
3.24, 3.32, 3.33 or 3.34, we have 𝑠(A) > 𝑠(𝝓). However, since both A and 𝝓 are elements of monad
F, in the current functional representation we get 𝑠(A) = 𝑠(A ∪ 𝝓) = inf { 𝑠(A), 𝑠(𝝓)} = 𝑠(𝝓). This
contradicts A ≻s 𝝓. But if we exclude 𝝓 in the definition of monad in order to derive the condition ii)
of definition 3.3 with keeping the word ‘non-empty’, then we do not know how to assign the function
value of S to 𝝓 in 𝑭∗ because any information about the rank of 𝝓 in the initial total preorder ≽s on
F is not available. If we try to assign the rank of 𝝓 separately, basically it is indifferent to the initial
definition of monad, i.e., including the residual hypothesis 𝝓. So, let’s introduce the following axiom.
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3.39 (self-confidence) For any hypotheses A in 𝑭∗ , 𝝓 ≽s A. 15
This means that the residual hypothesis, that is to say, any hypothesis implying the realization of some
currently unimaginable states is the most doubtful in comparison to any other currently imaginable
hypotheses in 𝑭∗ . Intuitively, this is coherent to 𝑠(𝛀) = 0 because both implies that a decision maker
thinks the future state will be realized out of the current imaginable list.
Definition 3.40

̅ is
For a given 𝜎-field 𝑭∗ over 𝛀 , if its monad F is normal, the degree space 𝑭

complete, the binary relation ≽s on F is reflexive, transitive, total, and its extended binary relation to
𝑭∗ is reducible, then ≽s is called the potential surprise order on 𝑭∗ .
̅ is automatically satisfied
Note that, in the previous definition, the anti-symmetric property of 𝑭
̅ = 𝑭/~𝑠. Thus ≽s on 𝑭
̅ is total order.
because of the property of equivalence class 𝑭

Theorem 3.41

̅ is order separable with respect to a
Suppose that a monad F is normal and 𝑭

̅ is finer than its order topology T≽s,
potential surprise order on 𝑭∗ . If an arbitrary topology T of 𝑭
then there exists a continuous potential surprise function s into [0, 1] preserving ≽s on 𝑭∗ .

The theorem 3.41 is the restatement of theorem 3.34 with the new definition of potential surprise
order on 𝑭∗ because the normality is a premise of definition 3.40.
Potential confirmation order on 𝑭∗ is defined in parallel to those of potential surprise. For a
̅ is complete, the binary relation
given 𝜎-field 𝑭∗ over Ω , if its monad F is normal, the degree space 𝑭
≽c on F is reflexive, transitive, total, and its extended binary relation to 𝑭∗ is reducible, then ≽c is
called the potential confirmation order on 𝑭∗ . Here the reducibility and self-confidence can be
redefined as the followings.

- Reducibility. For any hypothesis C in 𝑭∗ with C =∪ Ai where Ai ∈ F for all i in some indexing set
I, [C] ∼c supremum or least upper bound of { [Ai] in 𝑭̅ | i in I }.

15

This condition is similar to nonnegativity and nondegeneracy out of five axioms of qualitative probability relation by
De Finetti (1964) and Savage (1972).
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- Self-confidence. For any hypotheses A in 𝑭∗ , A ≽c 𝝓.

The previous theorems for potential surprise function can be proved for potential confirmation
function with the obvious modifications. The analogue of Theorem 3.41 in the potential confirmation
context becomes as following:
̅ is order separable with respect to a potential
Theorem 3.42 Suppose that a monad F is normal and 𝑭
̅ is finer than its order topology T≽c,, then
confirmation order on 𝑭∗ . If an arbitrary topology T of 𝑭
there is a continuous potential confirmation function c into [0, 1] preserving ≽c on F*.

4. Closing remarks
In this paper, we have constructed an axiomatic system of ordering relation defined on the 𝜎-field F*
as the space of hypotheses in order to derive the functional form of potential surprise which was
formalized by Katzner. For this task, we introduced monad F as a kind of basis space of 𝑭∗ spanning
all imaginable hypotheses by union operations in F. In addition, to investigate necessary topological
̅ , a quotient space of total preorder on monad F. Potential
conditions, we introduced the degree space 𝑭
surprise order and its functional representation on 𝑭∗ were constructed on such settings. From the
outcomes of this paper, Shacklean potential surprise has also obtained broader theoretical spectrum
to back up the concept.
However, the distinct features of Shacklean decision theory are not restricted to introducing
just an alternative measure of subjective uncertainty, but also including noble way how to deal with
such uncertainty measure in conjunction with the payoff information. Specifically, the payoff space
in Shacklean decision theory is divided by the qualitative difference between gain and loss, so that it
requires its corresponding functional steps to reflect the attitude of a decision maker with respect to
diverging anticipation between potential gain and loss. While potential surprise negates probability,
the next steps will be to replace the calculation of expected utility. This is the next research agenda.
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